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some subgame perfect equilibria rest on punisliment phases where both players are hurt.
When players can coinmunicate during play such punishments seem not credible. Therefore
we investigate Weakly Rcnegotiation Proof Equilibria (WRP). It is shown that the set oí
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1. Introduction.
Many new interesting insights have been gained by viewing the interaction between trade
unions and governments as non-cooperative games. Important questions are whether the
non~ooperative structure of the interaction between the players Ieads to inefficiencies, in
what sense the outcome is satisfactory seen from the government's point of view, and how
the outcome is aífected by the fact that the interaction takes place repeatedly. (The papers
brought together in Calmfors and Horn (1986), for example, discuss a number of these
issues).
One aspect of this interaction, upon which we focus in this paper, is the effect of
stabilization policy on union wage setting, and vice versa. Calmfors and Horn (1985)
argued that the tendency of governments to take up labour market slack in recessions may,
through its effect on union wage setting, have been one cause of stagflation in Sweden and
other corporatist and semi~orporatist European countries in the 1960's and 1970's. Driffill
(1984, 1985), using a similar model, argued that stabilization policy in the face of random
shocks to the eeonomy may have made unions ]ess concerned about the unemployment
consequences of high real wages, leading to a higher mean level, although to a lower
variance, of unemployment. This outcome results from a situation in which the government
and the trade union aze playing a non~ooperative one-shot game against each other. The
union is assumed to set the wage rate, and the government to choose the degree with which
it stabilizes employment against shocks. The outcome is inefficient for these two players,
and could clearly be improved upon if, for example, they were able to play cooperatively.
The inefficiency gives unions and governments an incentive to find alternative
arrangemeuts which make one or both better off, and in practice there have been episodes2
in which some kind of social contract between labour and government has been sought,
trading wage moderation ïor a more active stabilization policy. In the absence of the ability
to make binding contracts with each other to enforce a contract, repeated interaction can,
as is well known (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)), provide the means for sustaining such an
outcome in a non~ooperative game.
Repeated interaction was considered in Driffill (1985), where a simple trigger strategy was
assumed. The punishment which the government would use to discipline the union was
assumed to be the government's preferred action in the one-shot non-cooperative game.
Under appropriate conditions, it was shown that an equilibrium could be found in which
the players came closer to effïcient outcomes. However, there are a number of issues raised
by that analysis.
Firstly, the proposed punishment strategy does not exploit all the possibilities which the
game affords for supporting a better outcome. The folk theorems state, loosely speaking,
that all payoffs dominating the minmax point can be sustained by subgame perfect
equilibria of the infinitely repeated game with discounting, provided the discount factor is
high enough. In the game described in Driffill (1985), that implies that any efficient
outcome of the one-shot game could be sustained, with a high enough discount factor.
Thus, in this sense, the government has less difficulty in achieving its most-preferred point
on the Pareto-frontier of the stage game than was claimed in that paper.
Secondly, the proposed punishment involves the players in pursuing indefinitely a pair oï
strategies which lead to inefficient outcomes of the stage~ame. This may be unreasonable
if the players have the ability to communicate with each other and renegotiate strategies.
This criticism applies equally to many of the subgame perfect equilibria which rely on more
unpleasant punishments to which the folk theorem points. A number of authors, (including3
Farrell (1983), Farrell and Maskin (1987), Pearce (1987), and van Damme (1989)), have
argued that not all of the subgame perfect equilibria seem reasonable from this perspective,
they involve threats which hurt the punisher as well as the punished. Such threats can be
part of a subgame perfecL equilibrium, despite fact that when player 1 punishes player 2 he
hurts himself, because, if he stops punishing player 2 too soon, he will be punished by
player 2 for failing to carry out the punishment, and so it gces on.
In circumstances where the players have the possibility of communicating during play, this
kind of self-lacerating punishment dces not seem reasonable. Why shouldn't both players
agree to let bygones be bygones and move to the "good" phase of the game, rather than get
stuck in a bad phase where they are both hurt for a long time? Such considerations render
the most severe punishments incredible, and hence tend to restrict the set of possible
outcomes. According to this line of thought, credible punishments should benefit the
executor while punishing the punished.
In this paper, therefore, we investigate the possibilities of achieving efficient outcomes in
an ir~finitely repeated non-cooperative game when the union and the government can
renegotiate in the punishment phase. We explore the ability of either player to achieve his
own most preferred outcome from the set of Pareto-efficient outcomes of the stage game.
The setting is a simple macrceconomic model, essentially described by an aggregate labour
demand function which is decreasing in the real wage. The position of the curve is affected
by a stochastic shock which lrits the economy, and also by governmental stabilization
policy.
The players have the same target level for employment (e.g. full employment) and are
averse to variance in employment. The union likes high wages, whereas the government4
dislikes budget deficits. The trade union sets the real wage. The government can decide on
the degree of stabilization it will exert. The government is subject to a"Gramm-Rudmann
act": The expectation of government intervention in a single period should be zero. This
restriction is chosen, not because we find it compulsory that government budgets always
balance, but because we want to focus on pure stabilization policy. Hence, the question is,
whether the government, even with this restricted set of strategies, is able to achieve its
goals, which aze to stabilize the economy and achieve full employment while budget deficits
are avoided. This set up is close to, but not identical to, the one in Driffill (1985).
The results are that, for some parameter values (specifically, with a sufficiently high
discount factor) for any pair of actions on the one period contract curve, there is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the discounted repeated game where this pair of actions are chosen in
each period. This is also true for the pair of actions forming the bliss point of the
government's preferences (as well as the pair of actions forming the bliss point of the
union's preferences). So, in this sense, the government is able to achieve its goals even with
the very limited set of strategies allowed here. However, as discussed above, some subgame
perfect equilibria do not seem reasonable. Therefore we introduce the concept of "weak
renegotiation proofness" of Farrell and Maskin (1989). We show that the set of Pareto
efficient weakly renegotiation proof equilibria is strictly contained within the set of Pareto
efficient subgame perfect equilibria. In pazticulaz, neither player is able to achieve his bliss
point in a Pazeto efficient weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium. Lastly, it is showed that
there exists no weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium which for all discount factors strictly
less than one is strongiy renegotiation proof.5
2. The Economy
The model is the following:
U[(wwNc)i o] - Eio ótu(wc,Nc)~
u(wc,Nc) - wc- Q(Nc -1~~, 0 G 6 G 1, p 1 0
Nc-~o-atwcfGcfBc,ao~0,a110.
Gc - 7cec
V[(Nc,Gc)io] - Eio ótv(Nc,Gc) ~





U(-,-) and V(-,.) given by (1) and (4) aze the utility functions of the union and the
government respectively. u(.,-) and v(.,.) we call the period (expected) utilities. ó is the
(common) discount factor. We will assume throughout that it ie less than one, i.e. we only
consider the case where discounting takes place. The average utility corresponding to
U[(wc,Nr)io] is: (1-ó)E~o ótu(wc,Nc). Nc is employment, wc the real wage, Gc the
government expenditures, and Bc a stochastic disturbance. It is assumed that ~c is
identically and independently distributed for all t, that ita mean and variance exist, and
that E(Oc) - 0 and E(0~) ~ 0. R we will call full employment, and it is assumed that ao ~
R. The unions objective function in (1) is not standazd, but it has a number of desirable
features and at the same time makes for analytical tractability. It is quasi~oncave in
(N,w)-apace, and downward sloping for employment less that full employment (at which6
point it is horizontal). (2) is the labour demand function. (3) is the policy rule. It is clear
that with this rule E(G~) - 0 for all t, (3) is the implementation of the Gramm-Rudmann
act. In period t an action for the trade union is to set the real wage, w~, the government's
action is to choose the degree of stabilization, 7c. Both actions have to be taken before the
realization of B~ is known. Nature selects B~. The way thinga are modeled here, government
intervention becomes a stochastic variable.
The purpose of the restrictive form of (3) is to ensure that we consider purely stabilization
policy, and no attempt is made by the government to systematically increase or decrease
labour demand on average. This could be interpreted as being the consequence of a
restriction on government expenditure via the budget identity. It is more natural to think
of the government as being concerned with the size or variation in the national debt D
rather than with variation in stabilization activities Gi in a particular period. however the
formulation we have used simplifies the analysis, and has similar long run implications,
since the sma.ller the variance of G~ the smaller the variance of D in the long run.
The model is close to the one analyzed in Driffill (1985), but there are some minor
differences in the specification motivated primarily by analytical convenience.
At each stage in the game the players move simultaneously (this feature is at variance with
Driffill (1985)). We will only consider pure strategies. The history of the game in period t,
h~, is a list of all actions taken through period 1 to t-1: (w~,ry1iw2,ryZ,...,w~-l,ry~-i). The
action chosen by a player in period t may depend on this history. Thus, we assume perfect
recall and that there is perfect monitoring, the trade union can after each period t observe
the value of ryi that the government selected. A strategy, o;, for a player in the infinitely
repeated game is a function that in each period t, for each possible previous history,
prescribes an action in period t. A Nash-Equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game is a7
pair of strategies, such that for each player there dces not exist another etrategy which,
given the strategy oí the other player, gives higher expected utility. The subgame from
period t and onwards is just the game stazted in period t. A Snbgame-perfect eqnilibrinm
is a pair oí strategies such that the restriction of the strategies to each subgame forms a
Nash~quilibrium in that subgame. If hc ie a history and o- (oc,a~) a strategy pair then
the continuation of o aften c~, ahc, is the strategy pair prescribed by Q in the subgame
occuring after ht. The pay off to player i in that subgame is the continuation pay off to i
attached to the pair of continuation strategies (alht,a~bc). Finally a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game (also called the one shot Nash-equilibrium) is a pair of actions, such that for
both players it is true that there does not e~ást an action which, given the action of the
other, gives higher period utility.
3. The Stage Game.
In this section we will analyze the stage game in some detail. Using (2) and (3) we may
derive the indirect (expected) period utility functions ii, and v defined on action pairs
(wc,7c).
u(wc,1c) - wc - Q(ao - alwc -1~~ - Q(I f 7t)ZE(B~) (5)
~(wc,7c) --(ao - aiwc -~~ -((1 f 7c)~ f W 1'c~)E( B~) (6)
Then we have U[(wc,Nc)io] - Eio~n(wc,yc) and V[(wc,Nt)io] - Eio ótv(wc,ryc), where it
is implicitly understood that Nc is determined by (2) and (3).8
Given the action of the government, ryt, the best reply (with respect to the expected period
utility function) of the union can be found by maximizing (5) over w, one gets:
w(7c) - ~- f- a - R (~)
w(ryi) is seen to be independent of ryi, a feature which greatly simplifies our analysis. The
union's most preferred action pair (wu,ryu) is found by maximizing (5) over (w~,ryi). One
gets
wu 1 } cep - I`7 , ryu --1 - ~- ~t (8)
Not surprisingly the most preferred pair of actions for the union involves full stabilization.
We see that in (w~,ry~)-space the unions indifference curves are convex, closed orbits.
Likewise the (one period) best reply of the government, ry(w~), is found by maximizing (6)
over ry~ given w~, one gets:
7(wc) - - ~ (9)
which is independent of w~. The negative sign of ry corresponds to the fact that the
government stabilizes the economy. The most preferred pair of actions for the government
we denote (wg,ryg). It is easily found to be :
(10)9
We see that the most preferred pair of actions for the government involves less than full
stabilization. Full stabilization would involve too big a variance in government expenses.
By inserting it in (3) one sees (again, not surprisingly) that wg is the wage rate making the
expected employment equal to full employment. Also government indifference curves in
(w~,y~)-space are convex closed orbits.
(7) and (9) directly gives the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. ~'e see that the one shot
Nash equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium in dominant strategies in this game and that it is
given bY (w~,ryg).
The expectcd employment of the one shot Nash~quilibrium is:
E(N) - A - ai
which is less that full employment, also stabilization is less than full stabilization. For
expected employment to be positive in the one shot Nash equilibrium, it is necessary that
N~~~~ which we will assumc.
The way the model is specified, it is possible to have negative employment rates (choose a
very high wage rate). Negative employment is hard to accept for empirically oriented
economists like us. Therefore we will constrain the union to choose wage rates leading to a
non-negative expected employment, i.e. w~ ao~a~. It is possible for the government to
destabilize the economy by choosing y positive or very negative. This however hurts the
government itself, so we will (quite arbitrarily) restrict the government's set of actions to ry
E[-1,Oj, corresponding to all possibilities between full stabilization (ry --1) and no
stabilization (ry - 0). This restriction is not essential for our analysis as it turns out that
enlarging the set will not change the results qualitatively. With these restrictions on the10
action seta the minmaz actions (w',ry.) become:
w'-ao~a~,ryo-0
giving rise to the minmax utility levels:
u(w~~1") - ~~ f aaiR - E(B~)~
~(w~~1'g) - -R~ -~ E(e~)
(12)
(13)
Indifïerence curvea in the (wi,ryi) plane are depicted in figure 1 along with blisa points, the
one shot Nash equilibrium point, the minmax point, the one period contract curve and the
period reaction functiona, w(ry) and ry(w). The contract curve can be calculated as
1 1 1 f f 2a a 1 o -
w - ~~~ 7 } a ~p ~ 7 E [-1, - ~ (14)




The contract curve consist of action pairs which are efficient in the stage game. If we
depict the one period expected utilities associated with the action pairs on the contract




Only if this utility frontier is conca.ve will repeated play of any point on the contract curve
yield outcomes which are efficient in the repeated game. Otherwise there will be action
pairs on the contract curve such that playing them repeatedly is dominated by shifting
between two different action pairs on the contract curve. ):ienceforth we will concentrate on
repeated play of action pairs on the contract curve. Proposition 1 below shows that this
indeed corresponds to outcomes which are effïcient in the repeated game.
Proposition 1. The utility frontier of the stage game is strictly
concave.
Proof: Consider (wcc(ryo), ry~) and (wcc(ry'), -~), where ryg 1 yt ~ ryo ~ ry~.
Denote the associated utilities uo - u(wcc(yo), ~) ; vo e"v(wcc(ryo), ~); u' - u(wcc(~), ~) ;
v' -'v(wcc(ry'), ~). At an intermediate point (w~, ry~) between wcc(~), 7a and wcc(~), ~
defined by
w~ -~wcc(1A) f(1-~)wcc(7~), ry~ - a~ f(1-a)11 for 0 c~ c 1,
the associated utilities can be denoted u~, v~ and are given by
u~ - u(w~,7~) ~ v~ - ~(w~,7~).
By the strict concavity of u(.,.) and 'v(.,.): u~ ~~uo -F (1-~)u' and v~ ~ wo f(1-a)v'.13
Thus there exist feasible combinationa (u~, v~) of utilities which lie strictly above and to
the right of the straight line joining any two points (uo,vo) and (u',v') on the Pareto
írontier. Ilence the Pareto frontier is strictly concave. o
4. Subgame Periect Equilibria.
The one shot Nash equilibrium is inefficient. It is well known that repetition of a game
helps, in the sense that there are subgame perfect equilibria, where actions which aze
Pareto better than those corresponding to the one shot Nash equilibrium are chosen in each
period. In this section we will investigate whether all the points on the contract curve can
be implemented in subgame perfect equilibria. To be precise: Given any pair of actions on
the contract curve, dces there exist a subgame perfect equilibrium where these actions are
taken in each period? Theorem 1 gives the conditions under which the answer is
affirmative.
Theorem 1. If
1f~p ~ E(e2) ~ ~~
(15)
R~-~~~-' (~p~-~~ E(0~) (16)
are both fulfilled then for any pair of actions (w,ry) belonging to the
contract curve there exists a ó G 1 such that if à G ó G 1 there exists14
a subgame perfect equilibrium where (w,ry) aze the actione taken in
each period.
Proof: The proof is a simple application of theorem 1 in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
According to that theorem for any pair of payoffs dominating the payoff of the minmax
point there exists a D G 1 such that if ó ~ ó G 1 then this pair of payoffs can be realized in
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence, we shall demonstrate that for any point (w,ry) on the
contract curve the one period payoff to each player is greater than the payoff of the
minmax point.
First note that while (w~,ryu) ia the best point on the contract curve for the union then
(wg,ryg) is the worst point on the contract curve for the union. Exactly the opposite is true
for the government (see figure 1). Therefore it is sufficient to prove that:
u(wg,7~) ~ u(wu~1'o) and "v(wU~7u) ~ v(wm,~)
Using (5),(10), and (13) it is easily seen that the first inequality is equivalent to (15).
Similazly one sees by use of (6), (8) and (13) that the second inequality is equivalent to
(16). o
The condition (15) is neceasary for making the minmax point worse ïor the union than the
government optimum. High a~ and high ~ tends to make it fulfilled. High n~ means that
wage rate increasea have severe employment effects. High ~ means that these effects hurt
the union much. Hence in this case the gains for the union in case it defecta from taking the
actions that the government prefers most aze small, and by using a non-stabilizing15
strategy, the government can punish the union hard. Further, low ~p and high E(B)~ tends
to make (l5) fulGlled. Iligh E(0~) means that variance in employment is high and hence
that the non-stabilizing punishment of the government hurts the union much. Low ~p
means that the government does not care so much about variance in its expenses and hence
that it stabilizes quite a lot in the government optimum, (wg,ryg), which makes this point
more favorable to the union.
Under the maintained assumption that employment is positive in the one shot Nash
equilibrium the left hand side of (16) is positive. The right hand side is negative for cp C
'- I. Thus (16) can be fulfilled. High R, E(4Z) and low a~,~ and ~p tend to make it
fulfilled. It is leít to the reader to check that this conforms with intuitions. Finally it is
seen that it is perfectly possible to have (15) and (16) fulfilled at the same time.
Theorem 1 tells us that for some parameter values the government has the ability to
achieve its goals in the sense that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the
actions chosen in each period are the most preíerred by the government. Of course exactly
the same can be said about the ability of the union to enforce its goals. Figure 3 illustrates




5. Weakly R;enegotiation Proof Equilibria.
As remazked in the introduction not all subgame perfect equilibria seem reasonable, at
least in cases where the players have a possibility of communicating during play. In our
case it seems a highly artificial assumption to assert that the government and the union
cannot communicate e.g. between periods.
The problem is that some subgame perfect equilibria rest on punishment strategies which
(for a number of periods) hurt both players, including the player (the government say) who
punishes the other (the union) for a defection. Tliis can be a subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy for the government because if it defects on the punishment, then the union will17
punish the government [or not exercising the punishment. This, again, the union will do
because if it does not, then it will be punished, and so forth. Clearly, once in the
punishment phase the players have an incentive to agree on not carrying out all the
punishments - to let bygones be bygones. If the players can communicate during play it
seems likely that they will agree to evade such mutua! punishments. This, however, renders
such punishments incredible, and hence the equilibrium set becomes smaller if one takes
these objections seriously.
There are, in the literature several suggestions for equilibrium concepts which take
considerations such as those discussed above into account. See, e.g., Farrell (1983), Farrell
and Maskin (1987),(1989), Pearce (1987), and van Damme (1989). It would be fair to say
that there has not emerged a unanimous agreement on what is "the right concept". The
differences between the concepts pertain to what the abilities of the players are when they
renegotiate. Can they freely choose any new pair of strategies - in which case the past has
no influence at all - or are they to some extent constrained to renegotiate only within a
subset of all pairs of strategies? Farrell and Maskin (1989) consider what they ca11 "weak
renegotiation proofness". A weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium, (WIiP), is a pair of
strategies o- (ot,o2) which are subgame perfect and which has the property that there
dces not exist two continuations of a, o' and o" such that o' strictly dominates o".
WRP equilibria are renegotiation proof in the sense that no matter what happens players
will never end up playing according to a pair of continuation strategies of o which are
dominated by another pair of continuation strategies of a. Hence they will not have a
mutual interest in switching to another pair of continuation strategies of v. Expressed
another way the idea is that punishments should benefit the player exercising the
punishment. The motivation of course being that in this case he will not be willing to give
up the punishment earlier than when (perhaps) prescribed by the equilibrium strategy pair.18
Nothing guarantees that WRP equilibria or continuation payoffs of WRP equilibria are
Pareto efficient. Demanding that a strategy pair should be a WRP equilibrium is thus a
weak requirement. It should be seen as a necessazy rather than a sufficient requirement for
a strategy pair to be immune against renegotiation.
At first we will investigate which action pairs on the contract curve have the property that
they are taken repeatedly in a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium. The interesting
question of course in whether the requirement that an equilibrium should be not only
subgame perfect but also WRP shrinks the set of actions on the contract curve which can
occur repeatedly in equilibrium. Therefore we will henceforth assume that (15) and (16) are
fulfilled.









see figure 4. The action pair (w~(~,~ yields the best normal phase payoff for the
government and the worst for the union, which at the same time allows the government to
inflict a punishment pair (wg,ryP), where, if the union accepts the punishment, the
government is no worse oíf in the punishment phase than it was in the normal phase, and
where the union would be no better off by cheating on the punishment (wg,ryP), than it
would have been by sticking to normal phase play. If ry G ry then the union is in fact better
off in the normal phase (wcc(7),7) than when it cheats on the punishment (wg,ryP).
Similarly let wP,~ be the unique solution to the two equations
u(wP, I ) - u(wCC(L,~ (1H)
v(wP,7g) - V(wCC(~,~
See again figure 4. It is important to notice that:
-1 G~G 7C-~} ~ (19)
We now have the following theorem.20
Theorem 2. Assume that (15) and ( 16) are fulfilled. There exists a
weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium (ai,o2) such that (w~(ry),7)
are the pair of actions taken in each period only if:
1~ 7c 7
Conversely, if ~ c ry c ry then there exists a b c 1 such that if b c b c
1 there exists a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium with
(wcc( ry), y) the pair of actions taken in each period.
Proof: We will prove the "only if" part first. The proof draws on the proof of theorem 1 in
Farrell and Maskin (1989).
Assume that (oi,o2) is a WRP equilibrium such that (w~~(ry),ry) is the action pair taken in
each period, and assume that ry~ J~,ry[. To be specific assume that ry? ry. See figure 5.
Figure 5.21
If the union deviates optimally in a period from playing w~(7) it will in that period get the
expected utility u(w~,7) ~ u(wcc(7),7). In order to deter deviations the continuation
strategy pair must yield an average utility for the union atrictly less than u(w,7). Now,
consider the pair of continuation strategies (0~,02) of (oi,o2) which is the worst for the
union and the sequence of action pairs
(wr'7r)r-0
prescribed by (oi,oZ) (in case there are
more than one such pair choose the one which is best for the government). That such a pair
exist can be shown fairly easy from the fact that the action space (O,cr~~a7]x(-1,0] is
compact and from the fact that the indirect utility functions are continuous - for details
the reader is referred to Farrell and 1`4askin (1959), lemma 2.
Let u-(1-~ Er~O áru(wr'7r)' Then u C u(w,7) and since (oi,o2) is a WRP equilibrium
we must have v~ v(w,7) where v e(1-~ Er`~0 àrv(wr,7r). Note that v-(1-~"v(wo,7o) -f
b(1-~Er-1 ár-lv(wr'7r)' i.e. a convex combination of "v(wo,7o) and the average
continuation payoff in period r- 1. From this it is clear that if "v(wo,7o) c v, then
(1-b~Er-1 br-lv(wr'7r) 1 v. Since (vi,a2) is a WRP equilibrium this must imply that
the average continuation payofí to the union in period r- 1: (1-~E~1 6r-lu(wr'7r) ~ u'
But this contradicts the definition of (oi,o2). Therefore v(wo,7o) ? v, which since v~
`v(w,7) yields "v(wo,7o) ? v(w,7). Finally, u(w~,7o) C u, since otherwise it would be
profitable for the union to deviate in the first period and then accept the average payoff u
(which, remember, is the worst average payoff the union can get) contradicting that ( ai,a2)
is subgame perfect. Remembering that u c u(w,7), we now have u(w~,7o) c u(w,7)
Taken together we have shown that there exists a strategy pair (wo,7o) such that
v(wo,7o) ? v(w,7) and u(w~,7o) C u(w,7)22
But, this contradicts the assumption that 7? ry. The proof excluding 7~~ is similar.
Now we turn to the "if" part of theorem 2.
Suppose that ~ c 7 c ry. Consider the pair of simple (in the sense of Abreu (1988))
strategies (oi,oz) for the union and government respectively, described by the following
prescriptions:
a. Play (wcc(7),7) in each period as long as (wcc(7),7) w~ Played in the last period.
b. If the union deviated in the last period play wg (7P) for T~ periods, then restart phase a.
c. Ií the government deviated in the last period play wo (7~) for Tg periods. Then restart a.
d. In case of simultaneous deviations by both players ignore it.
Note that also deviations by the union (government) in any of the punishment phases
induces a restart of phase b(c).
Since ~ C 7 c ry we have:
v(wg,7P) 1 v(wcc(7),7) and u(wg,7P) C u(wcc(7),7)
and
u(wP,7~) ~ u(wcc(7),7) and v(wP,7~) C v(wcc(7),7)
(20)
(21)
(see figure 4) so (o1io2) described by a- d has tlie property that there exist no
continuation strategies dominating other continuation strategies.23
Hence it just rests to show that there exist T~ and Tg such that ( o~,oZ), given by the
prescriptions a through d, forms a subgame perfect equilibrium. Here (as Abreu (1988)
notes) it is sufficient to check that one shot deviations do not pay. By a one shot deviation
is understood that the player deviates in one period only and then conforms ever after. To
see this suppose on the contrary it is not true. Suppose that a player could gain by
deviating an infinite number of times. Due to discounting (6 c I), he could gain by
deviating a finite number, T say, of times then. I[ he gains by deviating in the last period,
T, we have a contradiction. Ií not then he gains from deviating in T-1 periods. Now
continue until the frst period of deviation is reached. Then we have a contradiction.
Hence, if no one shot deviation pays then no deviation pays. This is known as the
"unimprovability principle" of dynamic programming.
The best deviation for the union is to play w~. The average utility of the union, if it makes
a oneJshot deviation in phase a, is given by:
(1-ó)(u(w~,7) f~E1bYU(wg,ryP) f óTu}1-,~oóTU(wcc(ry),?')) -
(1-ó)(u(w~,7) f ó-ó ~~.u(wg,ryP) f óTTó-~u(wcc(7),?')) -
(1-ó)u(w~,7) f (~dTU}I)-tï(wg,ryP) f óTu}l~U(wcc(7),7)
Hence, the union does not gain by deviating in phase a if:
U(cc(7),7)) ? (I-s)U(w~,7) t (ó-óTU}1).u(wg,TP) f óTU}1-u(wcc(7),~r)24
which is equivalent to
~-' [u(wcc(7),7) - (1-~u(w~,ry)1 ? (1-óT")'~(wg,7P) f bTU'u(wcc(?'),ry) (22)
Correspondingly, the condition that it does not pay for the union to deviate in the start of
the punishment phase, is:
(1-óTU)'u(wg,7P) f óTu'u(wcc(ry),ry) ? u(wc,7P) (23)
Taken together (22) and (23) means that it does not pay for the union to make a one shot
deviation in phase a or in the start of phase b if:
á'[u(wcc(7),?') -(1-~U(wc,7)1 ? (1-óTU)'U(wg,ryP) f bTu'U(wcc(7),7) ? u(wc,~) (24)
By (20) for ó close to one we have that: á-[u(wcc(ry),ry) -(1-ó)u(wc,ry)1 ~ u(w~,ryP). Also
for ó close to one, the middle part of (24), (1-óTu).u(wg,ryP) f óTU.u(wcc(7),7), varies
almost continuously with integers T~. For T~ -. oo this term tends to u(wg,ryP) (ó is less than
one, remember) which is less than u(w~,ry~) (see figure 4). For T~ - 0 the middle term of
(24) reduces to u(wcc(ry),ry) and it is straightforward to show that this is greater than
á[u(wcc(ry),ry) -(1-ó)u(w~,ry)j. By (almost) continuity in integers T~ we then have that for
ó close enough to one there exists an integer T~ such that (24) is fulfilled. Hence it is not
optimal for the union to deviate in phase a as well as in the start of phase b, and of course
it is not optimal, then, to deviate later in phase b.
Finally by (21) u(wo,ry~) 1 u(wcc(1'),ry) so it is not optimal for the union to deviate in
phase c. Altogether we have shown that there exist a Tu such that for the union, the25
strategy described above is optimal regardless of the history of the game. In a completely
similar way one can show that the same holds true for the government. Together this
means that (ai,o2) forms a subgame perfect equilibrium.o
The set oí action pairs on the contract curve sustainable by a weakly renegotiation proof
equilibrium is illustrated in figure 4.
An immediate implication of theorem 2(see figure 4) is that the two bliss points aze not
contained in the set of action pairs sustainable by a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium,
cf. also (19). Hence, in this sense the government is not able to enforce its goals, contrary
to the case when we allow all subgame períect equilibria. Thus one important conclusion is
that the restriction to weakly renegotiation proof equilibria excludes strategy pairs
favouring one of the parties alone.
The proof of theorem 2 reveals that we have the following corollary to be used later.
Corollary. If (0~,02) is a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium with
average payoffs (u,v) then there exists action pairs (w',ry') and
(w",ry") such that
"v(w',ry') ? "v and u(w~,ry') C u
v(w",ryg) C v and u(w",ry") ~ u
The corollary corresponds to the "necessary" part of theorem 1 of Farrel and Maskin
(1989).26
Some of the WRP equilibria of theorem 2 rest on punishment strategies which are
inefficient even in the stage game. E.g. equilibria where action pairs (wcc(ry),ry) close to
(wcc(~,~ are played in each period rest on punishments involving actions off the contract
curve. See figure 4. One might wonder whether it is possible to sustain efficient WRP
equilibria by punishments involving only actions which are efficient in the stage game. This
requirement limits the severity of punishments e.g. the worst punishment action for the
union becomes (wg,ryg) (see figure 4). Theorem 3 below implies that the set of actions on
the contract curve which can be sustained by threats involving only action pairs on the
contract curve itself is not empty but strictly smaller than the set sustainable by WRP
equilibria. Needless to say the equilibria to which theorem 3 points are WRP.
Theorem 3. Assume that (15) and (16) aze fulfilled. Let (w,ry) be an
action pair on the contract curve. Then there exists a WRP
equilibrium (01,02) such that, for all histories continuation strategies
impiy action pairs on the contract curve, with (w,ry) the pair of
actions taken in each period, only if
u(w,7) 1 u(wc,~) and v(w,7) ) v(w~,?g) (25)
Conversely, if (w,ry) belongs to the contract curve and fulfills (25)
then there exists a b c 1 such that if 6 C b c 1 there exists a WRP
equilibrium, (vt,a2), specifying action paírs on the contract curve for
all histories, such that (w,-y) is the pair of actions taken in each
period.27
Prooí: For "only if": Assume that (0~,02) is a WRP equilibrium such that for all histories
continuation strategies imply action pairs on the contract curve with (w,ry) the pair of
actions taken in each period, but that (25) is not fulfilled, e.g. because u(w,ry) C u(w~,ryg). If
the union deviates optimally from playing w it will in the period of deviation get the
expected utility u(w~,ry). Since (01,02) only specify action pairs on the contra~ct curve the
worst retaliation by the government is to choose ry- ryg. If the union reacts by playing w~
it gets the expected utility u(w~,1g) ? u(w,ry) by assumption. Hence, we see that it pays for
the union to deviate from (w,ry) which can not be subgame perfect then. The proof of the
"if" part follows exactly the lines of the corresponding proof of theorem 2 and is therefore
omitted. o
The set of action pairs on the contract curve sustainable by threats which are efficient in
the stage game is depicted in figure 6.
i
Figure 6.
It should be noticed that, although the threats of the equilibria to which theorem 3 points28
are efficient in the stage game, the strict concavity of the Pareto frontier implies that the
continuation payoffs in the punishment phases are not efficient in the repeated game.
6. Strongly Renegotiation Proof Equilibria.
It might be argued that the requirement that a strategy pair should be a WRP equlibrium
is too weak. Certainly it does not ensure efficiency and even though one looks for efficient
equilibria continuation payoff pairs need not all be efficient, as e.g. in the case of theorem 3
of the preceding section. On the other hand it seems a very strong and even too strong a
requirement that continuation payoff pairs of a WRP equilibrium must not be dominated
by payoffs of subgame perfect equilibria which are not WRP themselves. If WRP equilibria
form the universe of "credible" equilibria it should only be considered an objection to a
proposed WRP equilibrium that some of its continuation payoff pairs are dominated by the
payoff pair associated with another WRP equilibrium . This motivates the definition of a
Strongly Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium.
A Strongly Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium, (SRP), is a pair of strategies o- (al,aZ)
which is (i) a WRP equilibrium and (ii) has the property that none of its continuation
payoff pairs are strictly dominated by the payoff pair of another WRP equilibrium.
Certainly for some discount factors there exist SRP equilibria. E.g. when the discount
factor is very low infinite repetition of the one shot Nash equilibrium is the only subgame
perfect equilibrium. Hence it is the only WRP equilibrium and accordingly it is SRP. As
the discount factor grows, however, new WRP equilibria arise some of which have average29
payoíf pairs which dominate those of the one shot Nash equilibrium which then ceases to be
SRP. From theorem 2 we know that for a discount factors close to one part of the Pazeto
frontier can be sustained by WRP equilibria hence it is cleaz that all payoff pairs
dominated by this part oí the frontier cannot be sustained by a SRP equilibrium. The
question therefore becomes, whether some efficient payoff pairs can be sustained by SRP
equilibria. Theorem 4 below does not exclude that this is the case for a given discount
factor, but states that for any strategy pair this strategy pair ca,nnot be a SRP if the
discount factor is sufficiently close to but strictly less than one. Hence, contrary to the set
of WRP equilibria, the set of SRP equilibria dces not simply grow as the discout factor
increases.
Theorem 4. Let o- (01,02) be any admissible strategy pair. There
exist a ó c 1 such that if á c ó G 1 then o is not SRP.
Proof: In this proof let vó(ai,o2) denote the average payoff to the goverment when (or,o2)
is the strategy pair and ó the discount factor. Define uó(ar,Q2) similazly for the union. Let
W-{(u,v)~ 3 ó E]0,1( and (oi,aZ) which is a WRP equilibrium s.t. u- uó(ot,oZ), v-
vó(vr,aZ)}. W is the set of payoff pairs which for some discount factor can be obtained as
average payoff pairs for some WRP equilibrium strategy pair.
From figure 4, (17),(18) and the corollary to theorem 2 it is clear that if (vi,o2) is a WRP
then vó(a~,oZ) ~"v(w~~(~,ry). On the other hand theorem 2 implies that for any F, 0 there
exists a ó G 1 such that there exists a WRP equilibrium ( o'i,dz) fulfiilling ~vó(o'~ 0'2) -
v(w~~(~,7) ~ c c. Similarly uó(ai,aZ) C u(wr~(~,~ and for any e 1 0 for ó sufficiently30
close to one ~ uó(al,az) -"u(wc~(~,~ ~ ~ E. This means that W is contained in the shaded




Theorem 2 further implies that all points on the pareto frontier, P, lying strictly between
point A and point B in figure 7 can be obtained as average payoff pairs in a WRP
equilibrium for a sufficiently high b. P fl W is thus open in P.
Clearly, if (ai,a2) is a WRP equilibrium then so are all its continuation strategy pairs.
Hence, if (a1,a2) is a WRP equilibrium then its average continuation payoft pairs are
contained in the set S in figure 7. As W C S it is clear that for all (u,v) E W` P there exist
(u',v') E W fl P strictly dominating (u,v). This implies that if (a1ia2) is SRP for all
discount factors 6, 0 ~ 6 ~ 1 then [ua(a~,a2),vb(ai,az)J E P n W and so do all its average
continuation payoffs. Let us assume that (a1,a2) is such a SRP, yielding average payoffs
(u,v). Because of the strict concavity of the Pareto frontier (aa,a2) must specify repeated
play of a single action pair on the contract curve, (w,ry) say, cf. the discussion in connection
with proposition 1.31
If the union deviates optimally in one period from playing w it gets in that period the
expected utility u(w~,ry) 7 u(w,ry). Hence (a1,a2) must prescribe a punishment for the
union in the case of defection, otherwise (o~,aZ) is not subgame perfect. Due again to the
strict concavity of the pazeto frontier this punishment must specify repeated play of a
particular action pair, (w~,ry~) say, for all subsequent periods. Of course (w~,~) should be
on the contract curve and ensure that a one shot deviation does not pay for the union, i.e.
(wl,ry~) should fulfill:
(1-~~(w~,1') } ~(w~,71) c U(w,7) p
u(w,ry) - U(wl,~) ~ ~ [u(wu,7) - u(w,1')) (26)
As [u(w~,ry) - u(w,ry)~ 1 0 this requires ~~ ry and w~ G w. Similarly there must be a
punishment (w2,~) ensuring that the union dces not deviate from (w~,ryi). Analogously to
the above one gets that this implies:
U(w~,?1) - U(w2,~) ~ ~ [u(w~,7t) - U(w~,~)~
Since u is separable in w and ry and since w~ c w we also have that
U(w~,71) - u(w1,7i) ~ u(w~,ry) - u(w,ry)
Adding (26) and (27) and using (28) yields




Of course there must also be a punishment (w~,ry~) deterring deviation from (w~,ry~) and so
forth. In this way we get a sequence of punishments (wn,~) where for each n we can derive
in the same way as (29) that:
u(w~7) - u(wn~1n) ~ n ~ ~u(wu~1') - n(w.ry)~ (30)
For n~ m (30) implies that u(wn,~) eventually becomea less than ii(wg,ryg) contradicting
the assumption that (w",ryT') is on the contract curve. o
Theorem 4 excludes the possibility that any strategy pair (ai,o2) can be a SRP equilibrium
for all discount factors less than one. We have not excluded the possibility that, for a given
value of 6 c 1, there exist SRP equilibria. Should they exist, they must have all their
continuation payoffs on the boundazy of the set of WRP equilibrium payoffs in order that
none of them is strictly Pareto dominated. This requires, inter alia, that for a given b G i,
the WRP equilibrium payoff set 18 clOSed, and this requirement appeazs to be satisfied in
our game. These matters should be a subject for further research.
6. Conclnding Remarks.
The object of this paper has been to investigate the abilities of the government to achieve
its goals by means of pure stabilization policy in an infinitely repeated policy game between
a union and the government. Results were that for some parameter values the set of
subgame perfect equilibria included an equilibrium in which the wage rate and stabilization
policy in each period was the best possible seen from the view point of the government and33
similazly íor the union. This result was proved by a simple application of a folk theorem.
However, taking into account the tact that some subgame perfect equilibria do not seem to
be credible and restricting attention to weakly renegotiation proof equilibria it was shown
that the equilibrium set for all pazameter values only included equilibria which did not
favour one party especially. Finally, it was shown that for any etrategy pair when the
discount factor becomes close to one that etrategy pair is not a stroagly renegotiation proof
equlibrium.
The analysis was undertaken in a simple macrceconomic model essentially consisting of a
decreasing demand function for labour. It would, in our eyes, be very interesting to see
whether similar results can be obtained in a model with more solid geaeral equilibrium
foundations. This should be a subject for further reseazch. Further we would find it
interesting to see what happens if one releases the requirement that government policies
should be purely stabilizing, i.e. to dismiss the Gramm-Rudmann act.
From a game theoretic perspective it seems interesting to see whether similar results as
those obtained here can be obtained under more general conditions but in the same basic
class of games, i.e. two player games with infinite action spaces, continuous reaction
functions etc. This will be a subject for further research.34
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